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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

DAMI-CI


17 October 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Espionage Profiles (U)

1. Attached is a copy of the CITD study which I cited at SECOM Seminar VI.
  2. The information is provided for whatever official use you deem appropriate.
- FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

Encl

  
ANTHONY J. GALLO, Jr.  
Colonel, GS  
Director of Counterintelligence

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/11/08 BY 60322  
EXEMPT FROM GDS



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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

**UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER  
ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212**

**IAX-P-CM**

**5 October 1984**

**SUBJECT: Espionage Profiles (U) (T-0009-S-UR)**

Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
ATTN: DAMI-CIC (LTC Hemovich)  
Washington, DC 20310

1. (U) Reference telecon, LTC Hemovich and Mr. Snyder, 1 Oct 84.
2. (C) A survey of 20 espionage cases involving Army personnel during 1950 - 83 surfaced the following areas of interest:
  - Average age: 30
  - MOS: intelligence, 25%; administrative, 25%; signal, 15%; maintenance and supply, 10%; driver, 10%; engineer, 5%; and cook, 5%.
  - Security Clearances: TS/access, 55%; S/access, 15%; S/no access, 15%; C, 5%; and none, 10%.
  - Location where volunteered/recruited: West Germany/Berlin, 50%; Washington, DC, 10%; East European countries, 25%; Japan, 5%; Iran, 5%; and Panama, 5%. (90% of cases commenced OCONUS with 75% being in the European theater.)
  - Recruited/volunteered: 55%/45%.
  - Motivation, all factors: Monetary, 85%; hostage (loosely interpreted), 25%; revenge, 10%; and ideology, 5%. (Multiple factors involved, thus the total exceeds 100%.)
  - Suitability factors: Low self-esteem or image, immaturity, irresponsibility, financial problems, alcohol problems, and marital problems.
3. (C) Personnel assigned to the European theater have been targeted by HOIS more than personnel in other theaters. Reasons are:

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• The European theater, especially West Germany and West Berlin, has a greater concentration of US personnel than the other theaters.

• Opportunities for contact by HOIS agents are greater in the European theater due to increased accessibility of US personnel. Opportunities for access include travelers passing through Soviet autobahn checkpoints, visits to East Berlin, increased opportunity for travel to, and visits with relatives, in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries and ability of HOIS operatives to blend in with the local environments to provide a masking of true intentions during the initial assessment stages.

4. (C) Ninety percent of the cases in the survey involved multiple suitability factors. The most common characteristics were immaturity, low self-esteem, and amoral behavior (a lack of loyalty to anyone or anything except themselves and money.) Closely following were problems with finances, marriage, alcohol, and minor legal scrapes. Mental/emotional/medical problems were most often associated with alcohol abuse. Extra-marital affairs were usually associated with immaturity and general amorality. While a significant number of cases involved homosexuality/sexual perversion, it was not a factor in recruitment in any case. Drugs were a significant factor in only one case, but were not a direct factor in recruitment as the individual wanted money to expand his drug business.

5. (C) The profile that emerged from this survey indicates a soldier or DA civilian most likely to become involved with HOIS would have the following characteristics:

- Have a need for money, either actual or perceived.
- Have several character flaws, most notably immaturity, lack of self-esteem or confidence, and amorality.
- Be married, but have marital problems.
- Be stationed in Europe or Washington, DC.
- Have a TOP SECRET or SECRET security clearance with access.
- Have an intelligence or administrative position.

6. (S) USAFOSI Special Report, Patterns and Trends in Espionage, May 1975, provided a short analysis of seven Air Force espionage cases. Analysis of the seven cases produced no firm, reliable "profile" of a "typical" USAF member who would be likely to commit espionage for a hostile power. Traditional indicators of possible espionage involvement have included suspicious foreign

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connections, signals of disloyalty to the US, and exploitable behavioral problems such as alcoholism or homosexuality. Conclusions from the analysis of the seven individuals tended to support the validity of the indicators, however, there were no absolute common denominators.

a. (S) Financial problems, of all indicators mentioned above, surfaced most frequently in the cases. Only one of the individuals' wives continually complained of a lack of money, but four of the individuals were trying to support extra-marital affairs. They knew HOIS would pay cash for information; thus, financial incentives were an important motivating factor.

b. (S) Other commonalities in experiences, behavioral patterns, and character were more difficult to link directly to espionage involvement. Six of the seven were married; five had foreign born wives. Six were born of "lower middle class" parents and entered service at a rather early age. Four of the six marriages were unstable. With one exception, all individuals were approaching middle age and had substantial years of military or federal service completed at time of recruitment. In general, the individuals were described as rather moody, self-indulgent, weak-willed persons having trouble coping with the pressures and responsibilities of their personal and/or service lives.

c. (S) Most of the seven served in sensitive positions. Five had been granted access to TOP SECRET information while another, because he knew the necessary safe combination, had similar access. Six of the seven were assigned to duties which provided access to intelligence information. Three were in administrative positions and three were directly assigned to intelligence or counterintelligence organizations. Five of the seven were recruited overseas.

7. (C) A review by another government agency of 76 espionage cases from all services and government agencies revealed similar data.

a. (S/NF) 50 percent of all cases involved volunteers whose primary motivation was money with revenge also an important motivator. Of those recruited, the monetary factor was the primary motivator. Of those committing espionage for money, display of affluence, normally expected to be one indicator of espionage, was not evident in a great majority of the cases. Money, emotional involvement, friendship and ideology were fairly equal motives common to the volunteers and non-volunteers. Revenge and thrills were more prevalent for the volunteers.

b. (S/NF) The majority of the service personnel involved were in grades E-1 to E-6. A smaller percentage were in the E-7 to E-9 and O-1 to O-3 grade levels. The average age at recruitment was 31, however, 25 was the age when more individuals were recruited.

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
c. (S/NF) Almost 60 percent of the individuals had served overseas and 50 percent had developed foreign connections of some type, usually later in life. Given the fact more of the military serve tours overseas, this is not surprising.

d. (S/NF) Personal traits displayed were varied with the following being most prominent: drinker, indebted, medical problems, excellent work record, well liked, immature, intelligent, gambler, loner, lover, arrogant, and criminal.

8. (C) None of the studies and surveys generated a method of determining who will become involved with HOIS and who will not. The profiles that emerge would fit several thousand soldiers and civilians. Even then, it is not inclusive. About one-fourth of the Army individuals who committed, or attempted to commit, espionage during the 1950 - 1983 period did not fully fit the profile.

9. (C) There is, in reality, no reliable profile of a potential espionage agent which would definitely indicate personnel susceptible to HOIS approaches and recruitment. Some individuals who exhibit one or more of the above mentioned behavioral traits may be vulnerable to HOIS recruitment; others who exhibit the same traits may not be. It largely depends on the quality of each individual's character and that is usually an intangible and immeasurable factor. Even so, individuals who have significant psychological or behavioral problems and are unable to cope with the pressures and responsibilities of modern life, especially when faced with financial problems, may be the most vulnerable and thus the most susceptible to HOIS recruitment.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JAMES L. SNYDER  
Chief, CITD

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